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Democracy as a Lesser Evil: Testing 
the Churchillian Notion of Democracy 
in South Africa and South Korea 
Abstract 
Winston Churchill asserted in 1947 that “democracy is the worst form of 
government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to 
time.” To date, this lesser-evil notion of democracy has been tested only in the 
post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe. As a result, little is 
known about how useful, or valid, this notion of democracy as a lesser evil is 
for analysing the popular perceptions of democracy among the mass publics of 
new democracies in other regions. To fill this gap in existing literature, this 
study analyses public opinion data from South Africa and South Korea. Our 
analysis of these data reveals that the Churchillian notion of democracy as a 
lesser evil is of limited use as an alternative paradigm for the study of 
democratisation, especially from the perspective of ordinary citizens in the 
midst of that political experience. 
 
“… democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that 
have been tried from time to time.” 
Winston Churchill, 1947 
Why do ordinary citizens prefer to live in a democracy? Why do these citizens 
continue to support their democratic political systems even when those systems 
fail to function to their satisfaction?  For the past decade, political scientists 
have proposed and tested a variety of theoretical models to address these and 
other related questions regarding mass reactions to the democratisation of 
authoritarian rule (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Camp 2001; 
Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; Haerpfer 2001; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; 
Linz and Stepan 1996; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina 1998; Norris 1999; 
Pharr and Putnam 2000; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999).  The 
most unassuming of these models is derived from Winston Churchill’s eloquent 
assertion that “democracy is the worst form of government, except all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time.”  
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To Churchill, democracy was a form of government that performs badly but not 
as badly as non-democratic forms of government. In this conceptualisation, 
democracy no longer represents the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice that 
appear in the works of such political philosophers and theorists as John Locke, 
Thomas Jefferson, and Robert Dahl (for a review of this literature, see Mueller 
1999 and Powell Jr. 1982).  Nor does it even represent a “kinder and gentler” 
form of government, which both ordinary citizens and political leaders in new 
democratic states have sought to establish since the current wave of global 
democratisation began three decades ago (Lijphart 1999).  Democracy is viewed 
merely as a lesser evil, a view that directly challenges the idealistic or positive 
notion that has long been accepted in the theoretical and empirical literature on 
democracy (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997; Chu, 
Diamond, and Shin 2001). 
Moreover, the Churchillian notion that democracy constitutes a lesser evil 
directly challenges a growing body of literature on democratic consolidation. 
The existing literature emphasises the importance of the mass public embracing 
democracy for the consolidation of nascent democratic rule (Alexander 2002; 
Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996). In this literature, citizens are assumed to 
embrace democracy as “the only game in town” when they judge it to perform 
to their satisfaction. Rejecting this prevailing wisdom linking positive 
perceptions of a new democratic political system to popular support for 
democracy, the Churchillian notion of democracy offers an alternative approach 
to the study of democratic consolidation, as noted by Bratton, Mattes, and 
Gyimah-Boadi (2004) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000). 
For Churchill’s quote to hold any truth, citizens must compare their own 
experiences of political life under democratic and undemocratic systems. The 
recent surge in democratic transitions in the various regions of the world has 
made this comparison possible, thereby making an empirical evaluation of this 
notion of democracy possible as well. To date, however, this proposition has 
been tested exclusively within the context of post-communist societies in East 
and Central Europe (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Shin and Wells 2001). 
As a result, little is known about the validity of this lesser-evil notion for 
categorising perceptions of democracy in new democracies in other regions or 
about how much the lesser-evil perception shapes support for democracy. 
To address this gap in the literature, this study examines survey data from South 
Africa and South Korea, two new democracies that represent the most 
successful examples of democratisation in their respective regions. We use this 
data to ask, and answer, a series of empirical questions about democracy as a 
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lesser evil.  First, we determine the extent to which citizens in these new 
democracies actually support democracy.  Second, we ask what percentage of 
the mass publics in South Africa and South Korea perceive their newly formed 
democratic systems to be less evil than, more evil than, or equally evil to the 
regime they knew prior to their recent transitions to democracy. After answering 
these questions, we ask if those who do perceive the current government to be a 
lesser evil continue to embrace democracy as the preferred form of government. 
Finally, we ask whether in these two countries, the perception of democracy as a 
lesser evil stimulates public support for democratisation more or less than other 
views of democracy.  
This paper has six sections.  In the section that follows immediately, we review 
efforts to test the Churchillian notion of democracy. In the next section, we 
develop the lesser-evil notion as a concept and distinguish it from other forms 
of so-called “evil”-government concepts. Next, we highlight the most notable 
features of democratisation in South Africa and South Korea. We then discuss 
the measurement of the independent and dependent variables used to 
empirically test the Churchillian conceptualisation of democracy developed in 
section two. In the fifth section, we present the results of various empirical 
analyses. The final section summarises the key findings of our research and 
discusses their implications for the study of democratic regime change. 
1. Previous Research 
Over the past decade, a great deal of survey research has investigated the 
sources and consequences of divergent perceptions and understandings of 
democracy. In Europe, Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer regularly 
conducted the New Democracies Barometer Surveys, Russia Barometer 
Surveys, and Baltic Barometer Surveys.  In Southern Europe, Jose Montero and 
Leonardo Morlino conducted several waves of national sample surveys in 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece. In Latin America, Marta Lagos has recently 
begun conducting annual Latino Barometer surveys in Spain and fifteen Latin 
American countries.  In Africa, Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes have 
launched the Afrobarometer surveys. In addition, James Gibson and many other 
scholars from Asia, Europe, and the United States have conducted numerous 
single-country surveys in new democracies.  As effective as these previous 
studies are in helping scholars to understand popular support for democracy, 
their usefulness in explaining and testing the Churchillian notion of democracy 
as a lesser evil is limited in two key ways. 
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First, most of this research has been designed to uncover popular conceptions of 
democracy as a series of political ideals rather than popular perceptions of 
democracy as a political reality (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; Miller Hesli 
and Reisinger 1997; Simon 1994).  Instead of examining the actual reactions 
citizens in new democracies have had to divergent regimes, these studies tapped 
the value citizens attach to the idea of democracy. From such idealistic 
conceptions, it is difficult to infer realistic assessments of democratic 
governments in action. There is always a wide gulf between what people aspire 
to and what they experience in their daily lives (Mueller, 1999; Rose, Mishler, 
and Haerpfer 1998). 
Second, the bulk of the existing survey research has been conducted from an 
absolute perspective that does not involve comparisons with alternative 
government forms (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cusack 1999; Fuchs, 
Guidorossi and Svensson 1995; Klingemann 1999). The satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the current democratic system, for example, offers no basis 
for a discussion on whether it performs better or worse than its authoritarian 
predecessors. To date, only a very limited number of studies have analysed 
respondents’ direct comparisons of the non-democratic and democratic regimes 
they have experienced (Bratton and Mattes 2002; Rose 1995; Shin 1999).  
Although it is possible for  these studies to determine which political system, 
democratic or undemocratic, is seen as performing better, these studies have 
been unable to determine whether the current democratic system is preferable to 
its authoritarian predecessor in a positive sense or in a negative sense. The 
direct comparisons that these survey-based studies employ merely allow 
researchers to indicate the extent to which the former is more or less preferable 
to the latter without specifying the exact nature of such preference, i.e., positive 
or negative.   
To overcome these two key limitations of previous research and properly test 
the theory that a country’s people will support a malfunctioning democratic 
regime so long as they perceive the alternative to be worse, we must ask them to 
make separate assessments of each of the authoritarian and democratic regimes 
that have ruled over them so we can compare their past and present political 
experiences. This comparison allows for determining accurately whether the 
current regime is either negatively or positively preferable to the past one. 
In their New Democracies Barometer surveys, Richard Rose, William Mishler, 
and Christian Haerpfer (1998) pioneered this type of survey work by asking 
respondents to make separate assessments of the Communist and post-
Communist systems (they did not ask about the experience of transitioning from 
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communism to a democratic regime). Individual respondents’ separate ratings 
of each system were compared to estimate the proportion of people who prefer 
the post-Communist regime to the Communist regime. More than half the mass 
publics in Central and Eastern Europe were found to have such a preference 
(Rose and Mishler 1996, 36). This finding was interpreted to support the 
Churchillian notion of democracy as a lesser evil. In testing this notion, 
however, Rose and his associates mistakenly equated being a lesser evil with 
being relatively preferable. In reality, a new regime must be judged to perform 
badly or negatively to be rightly called an evil democratic regime, and for an 
evil democratic regime to be called a lesser evil, it must be viewed as 
undesirable but less undesirable than any non-democratic alternatives.   
Clearly, Rose and his associates distorted the notion of democracy as a lesser 
evil by suggesting that any current regime, whether perceived as a democracy or 
a non-democracy, is a lesser-evil democracy so as long as its citizens find it 
preferable to the old regime. Under this definition, even a positively functioning 
current regime would be considered a lesser evil if it performs better than the 
old Communist regime. Obviously, this definition constitutes a classic example 
of a stretched concept (cf. Collier and Levitsky 1997); thus Democracy and Its 
Alternatives cannot be accepted as a robust test of Churchill’s original notion of 
democracy as a lesser evil, as the authors claim (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 
1998, 85).   
2. Conceptualising Democracy as a Lesser Evil 
As this review of existing literature has suggested, the Churchillian notion of 
democracy as a lesser evil is a complex concept that involves much more than a 
mere description of a single political entity. It requires the evaluation and 
comparison of divergent political systems. In making a comparative evaluation 
of those systems, it emphasises their frequent failures to satisfy the citizenry and 
thus prescribes a negative perspective to the evaluation. Conceptually, therefore, 
the Churchillan notion constitutes a framework for evaluating the failings of 
democratic and non-democratic political systems from a comparative 
perspective. 
Empirically, the notion rejects the popular view that democracy is the ideal form 
of government. Instead, it holds first that democracy, like its non-democratic 
alternatives, is a bad or undesirable political system. Second, it further holds 
that democracy is merely less undesirable as a political system than its 
 
 5
undemocratic alternatives. Referring to a system of government that does not 
dissatisfy its people as much as did a previous non-democratic government, 
democracy is appraised as a lesser evil. Accordingly, the notion of democracy 
as a lesser evil becomes valid only when the assessments of both the democratic 
and non-democratic systems by individual citizens are negative and the 
assessments of the former are less negative that those of the latter. 
Theoretically, the Churchillian notion offers a hypothesis linking the negative 
perceptions of a new democratic political system to popular support for 
democracy. According to this hypothesis, individual citizens in a new 
democracy tend to support their current democratic political system so long as 
they view the system as less evil than all its predecessors (Rose, Mishler, and 
Haerpfer 1998).  This hypothesis also suggests that those who perceive the 
system as a lesser evil are more supportive of democracy than those who view 
the system as an evil greater than or equal to preceding systems. A current 
democratic regime becomes a lesser evil when its citizens view it as less 
undesirable than old systems, and it becomes a greater evil when they view it 
as more undesirable. The current system becomes an equal evil when citizens 
view it and preceding systems as equally undesirable. Only when a significantly 
higher level of democratic support corresponds with the category of lesser evil 
can we argue that the hypothesis holds true and that Churchill’s statement offers 
a practical perspective for studying democratisation in progress.  
In short, the notion of democracy as a lesser evil embodies two new noteworthy 
ideas, which contrast sharply with those underlying the prevailing paradigm that 
emphasises positive conceptions of democracy among the mass public as a 
cultural foundation for the consolidation of nascent democracies. Conceptually, 
this notion offers a tool for empirical observation by focusing on democracy-in-
action rather than democracy-in-principle.  Specifically, it offers a realistic 
perspective that provides insight into how individual citizens of newly 
democratising countries perceive and understand their regime even when they 
have no knowledge of democratic theory and little experience in democratic 
politics. Theoretically, this vantage point offers an untraditional explanation of 
why those citizens continue to support a new democratic regime, even when it 
fails to perform to their satisfaction. To empirically investigate this 
conceptualisation of Churchill’s vision of democracy, we examine recently 
collected survey data from South Africa and South Korea, which serve as prime 
examples of new democracies that have emerged outside of Eastern and Central 
Europe.   
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3. Democratisation in South Africa and South 
Korea 
South Africa and South Korea are widely known as two great success stories 
from the “third wave” of democratisation. In 1994, after sixty years of rule by a 
white minority, South Africa held its first non-racial national election.  Since 
this first election, South Africa has moved to erase the discriminatory legacy of 
Apartheid and to create a political arena that is open to all parts of society 
(Wines and LaFraniere 2004). Although the results of these reform efforts have 
been mixed — the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that worked to unearth 
and resolve Apartheid era injustices has been widely criticised and much of the 
public remains disillusioned with government — all parts of society are able to 
shape government through the ballot box and no unlawful challenges to the 
post-Apartheid government have occurred (Gibson and Gouws 1999).   
To date, South Africans have voted in three national elections (1994, 1999, and 
2004) and numerous regional and local elections. In a region known for political 
instability (sub-Saharan Africa has had more military coups than any other 
region),  these regular, free and fair elections are clear signs that democracy has 
begun to take root.  It is important to note, however, that opposition parties have 
had little success in national elections (in the last elections the African National 
Congress won a two-thirds majority in parliament). Even so, in light of the 
relative smooth transfer of power from the white minority to the black majority 
and continued economic development, South Africa’s prospects for 
consolidation may be brighter than any other new democracy in Africa.   
 South Korea’s transition to democracy has likewise been noteworthy. Since its 
transition from decades of military rule in the wake of the 1987 “founding 
elections,” South Korea has maintained a constitutional democracy.  To date, 
the electorate has chosen four different governments through democratic 
elections. These governments successfully implemented a large number of 
electoral and other reforms designed to transform the institutions and 
procedures of military-authoritarian rule into those of representative democracy. 
Unlike counterparts in Latin America and elsewhere, South Korea has fully 
restored civilian rule by extricating the military from power (Diamond and Kim 
2000; Diamond and Shin 2000). 
Furthermore, South Korea is the only new democracy in East Asia that has not 
only transferred power peacefully to an opposition party but has also fully 
transformed its age-old crony capitalism into a competitive and transparent 
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market economy. South Korea has also attracted attention for using Internet 
information technology in presidential elections to an extent not yet observed in 
even more advanced democratic countries, including those in Western Europe 
and North America (Choo 2002). In the latest presidential election held on 
December 19, 2002, the South Korean people elected for the first time a 
relatively young and liberal candidate to lead their nation — a nation where age 
has long played an important role in political and all other aspects of life (Choo 
2002; Lee and Baik 2002). As a result of all these accomplishments, South 
Korea is widely regarded as one of the most vigorous and analytically 
interesting third-wave democracies in East Asia (Kim 2003; Shin 1999). 
4. Measurement 
Do the South African and South Korean people actually perceive their political 
systems as a lesser evil, consistent with Churchill’s characterisation of more 
than half a century ago?  To address this question properly, the perception of 
democracy as a lesser evil should be differentiated from the perception that the 
current system is generally preferable to the old system. The perception must be 
that the existing system creates an undesirable situation but a less undesirable 
situation than the preceding system. To compare the current and old systems in 
terms of their undesirability and thereby test the notion of a lesser evil takes 
three steps.   
In both South Africa and South Korea, respondents were asked to evaluate, on a 
separate basis, the overall quality of the past and present regimes on a numeric 
scale in which the lowest and highest scores (0 and 10 in South Africa and 0 
and100 in South Korea) mean, respectively, the worst and best systems of 
government (for the methodology of these surveys, see Bratton and Mattes 2001 
and Shin 1999). We first collapsed the original numeric ratings of the present 
regime into the two general categories of evil and non-evil regime perceptions 
on the basis of whether or not those ratings were lower than their scale’s 
midpoint.  From the ratings of the present regime, we then subtracted those of 
the past regime and collapsed the resultant scores of this operation into three 
subcategories, negative, neutral, and positive. These three subcategories were 
considered indicative of individuals’ perceptions of the nature of the regime 
change. 
In the case of negative evaluations of the current regime, positive perceptions of 
the regime change indicate the existing regime creates a less undesirable state 
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than the preceding regime. These scores were, therefore, collapsed into the 
subcategory of lesser evils. Negative evaluations of the change, on the other 
hand, indicate the existing system creates a more undesirable state than the 
preceding system and thus were collapsed into the category of greater evils. 
Neutral evaluations indicate the existing and preceding systems create an 
equally undesirable state and thus were collapsed into the category of equal 
evils. By distinguishing perceptions of lesser evils from those of other evils and 
non-evils, this scheme of classification allows us to determine the proportions of 
ordinary people in South Africa and South Korea who subscribe to the 
Churchillian notion of democracy. 
To test the Churchillian-based hypothesis that a lesser-evil perception of 
democracy can coexist with and even foster support for democratisation, we 
constructed a separate measure of the extent to which individuals support 
democracy and use this measure as a dependent variable. This allows us to ask 
if the people in these two countries tend to support democracy when they see 
the current democratic regime as a lesser evil and if people who view 
democracy as a lesser evil are more supportive of democracy than those who 
view it as a greater or equal evil.   
To answer these questions, we selected two pairs of items tapping both pro-
democratic and antiauthoritarian dimensions of democratic support. The first 
pair concerns the extent to which respondents are favourably oriented toward 
democracy as a political system and as a method of governance. The second 
pair focuses on the extent to which they are unfavourably oriented toward non-
democratic political systems, including the one in which they lived prior to 
democratic regime change, the apartheid regime in the case of South Africa and 
military regime in the case of South Korea. 
Pro-democratic and antiauthoritarian responses to these two pairs of items were 
dichotomised and combined into a 5-point index estimating the overall levels of 
democratic support among South Africans and South Koreans. Antidemocratic 
responses to both questions in the first pair and pro-authoritarian responses to 
both questions in the second pair would merit a score of 0 (no democratic 
support); pro-democratic responses to both questions in the first pair and 
antiauthoritarian responses to both questions in the second pair would merit a 
score of 4 (full democratic support). Only those who score higher than the index 
midpoint of 2 are considered supporters of democracy (both national samples 
had a mean of 2.6). Once calculated, supporters’ proportions were compared 
across all four categories of regime-change assessments: non-evils, lesser evils, 
equal evils, and greater evils.  
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5. Democratic Support in South Africa and 
South Korea 
Before we determine the extent to which citizens view democracy as a lesser-
evil system and ask how such views influence support for democracy, we must 
measure our dependent variable and determine the extent to which the mass 
publics in these new democracies are attached to democracy.  Table 1 reports 
the percentage of respondents in each country that embraces democracy and 
rejects authoritarianism. It also reports the distribution of these respondents 
across the 5-point index measure of overall democratic support.   
Table 1. Measuring Support for Democracy 
A. Pro-democratic and Antiauthoritarian Orientations 
Political Orientations South Africa South Korea 
Rejection of authoritarian reversal    65.3%   80.7% 
Rejection of civilian dictatorship 69.1 81.4 
Preference for democratic regime 59.6 68.9 
Attachment to democratic governance 54.1 33.3 
(N) (2,016) (1,058) 
 
B. Overall Levels of Democratic Support (summative index) 
Index Score South Africa South Korea 
0 (no support)    4.3%    3.2% 
1 13.4 11.7 
2 18.2 22.3 
3 23.7 35.3 
4 (full support) 26.8 24.4 
(No answer) (13.5) (3.0) 
Sources: 2000 South Africa Democracy survey and 1997 Korea Democracy Barometer survey. 
As Table 1, Panel A indicates, majorities in each country support democracy by 
preferring it to its predecessors. In both South Africa and South Korea, more 
than three-fifths of the population rejects the idea of authoritarian reversals and 
civilian dictators.  Likewise, sixty percent of those in both countries also state a 
preference for democracy. In addition, just over half of all South Africans have 
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an attachment to democratic governance. The one exception to this 
overwhelming support for democracy is that about one-third of all South 
Koreans reported an attachment to democratic governance. Many South 
Koreans appear to remain nostalgic for the authoritarian method of governance, 
which freed themselves from decades of poverty and unemployment. 
When responses to all four questions are considered together in Table 1, Panel 
B, it is evident that a majority in each country chooses democracy over its 
alternatives. By embracing democratic rule fully while rejecting authoritarian 
rule at least to some extent or embracing democracy at least to some extent 
while rejecting authoritarian alternatives fully, 51 percent of South Africans and 
60 percent of South Koreans prefer to live in a democracy.  Moreover, a quarter 
of the population in each country (27% for South Africa and 24% for South 
Korea) expressed unconditional commitment to democracy with fully pro-
democratic and antiauthoritarian responses to the four questions. These findings 
suggest that, whatever citizens’ views of democracy may be, large percentages 
of those who live in both countries support democracy.   
Now that we know the extent to which individuals support democracy, we can 
ask how various perceptions of the current political system affect democratic 
support.   
5.1 The Notion of a Lesser Evil as a Political 
Phenomenon 
Viewing democracy as a lesser-evil form of government requires individual 
citizens in new democracies to perceive the current democratic political system 
as negative but preferable to the old authoritarian system. The present analysis 
compares separate perceptions of the current and old political systems among 
the South African and South Korean mass publics and identifies four distinct 
categories of evil and non-evil perceptions. These categories include: (1) non-
evil; (2) lesser evil; (3) equal evil; and (4) greater evil.  In Table 2 we report the 
percentage of respondents in each country who are placed in each of these 
categories.  
Strikingly, a relatively large percentage of ordinary citizens in both of these 
countries reported seeing the newly installed political system as evil. In South 
Africa, fully one-quarter of the population (25%) perceived the existing 
democratic system in a negative light and more than half of the respondents in 
South Korea (54%) classified democracy as an evil regime. However, most of 
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the respondents who perceived the current regime negatively do not see it as a 
lesser evil. Instead, of the South Africans and South Koreans who see the 
current democratic regime as an evil regime, a majority (58% in South Africa 
and 77% in South Korea) see it as a greater evil, a system that performs worse 
than the system they knew in the past. Only a small minority of South Africans 
(7%) and South Koreans (5%) view their new democratic regimes as lesser 
evils, or less undesirable systems.   
Table 2. Popular Assessments of Democratic Regime Change 
Various Assessments South Africa South Korea 
A. Evil Regime (24.8%) (54.1%) 
    1. more unattractive    14.4    41.8 
    2. equally unattractive      3.0      7.5 
    3. less unattractive      7.4      4.8 
B. Non-Evil Regime (75.2%) (42.9%) 
    1. less attractive    10.4    15.7 
    2. equally attractive      5.4      9.5 
    3. more attractive    59.4    17.7 
(N) (2,016) (1,058) 
          Sources: 2000 South Africa Democracy survey and 1997 Korea Democracy Barometer survey. 
Obviously, most citizens of South Africa and South Korea do not view their 
current democratic political systems as lesser evils. Nonetheless, this analysis 
empirically validates the notion of a lesser evil as one of the conceptual devices 
some citizens of new democratic states use to appraise their current system of 
governance. Thus, Churchill’s notion of democracy as a lesser evil is not a 
political fabrication but a concept referring to an observable phenomenon in the 
real world of democratic politics. Yet the results do not support the inference 
that citizens of a new democracy would tend to see their government as a lesser 
evil. In South Africa and South Korea, therefore, the Churchillian epigram fits 





5.2 The Notion of a Lesser Evil as a Hypothesis 
The Churchillian notion of democracy as a hypothesis holds that a new 
democratic regime can remain preferable to its citizens even when they view it 
negatively, or as evil, so long as they view it as lesser evil than all the other 
forms of government they have previously experienced.  This hypothesis also 
implies that people who perceive the new democratic system as a lesser evil are 
more supportive of democracy than those who view the system as an equal or 
greater evil. Table 3 shows how the levels of democratic support vary across the 
four categories of evil and non-evil perceptions of the existing political system. 
Table 3. A Bivariate Test of the Churchillian Model of Democratic 
Support 
Types of Assessments South Africa South Korea 
(entire sample) (58.4%) (62.0%) 
A. Evils 38.5%   56.2% 
    1. Greater evil      29.2        53.3 
    2. Equal evil      43.1        65.5 
    3. Lesser evil      53.1        67.1 
B. Non-evil 64.5%  69.1% 
    1. Less attractive         37.7        64.6 
    2. Equally attractive      44.9        67.2 
    3. More attractive      69.8        74.6 
(eta)     (.29)       (.19) 
Note: entries are percentages of democrats among those in each category of regime assessments. 
Sources: 2000 South Africa Democracy survey and 1997 Korea Democracy Barometer survey.  
In both South Africa and South Korea, a majority of ordinary citizens tend to 
choose a democracy over its alternatives when they perceive the existing 
political system as a lesser evil. When the current system is perceived to 
perform poorly but less poorly than its non-democratic predecessors, 53 percent 
of South Africans and 67 percent of South Koreans support democracy by 
embracing democratic rule fully while rejecting authoritarian rule at least to 
some extent or by embracing democratic rule at least to some extent while 
rejecting authoritarian rule fully. In each country, perceptions of the current 
democratic regime as a lesser evil appear to motivate a majority of the citizens 
who view democracy negatively to support democracy. 
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Equally notable is that individuals who perceive the current regime as a lesser 
evil are more supportive of democracy than those who perceive it as a greater or 
even equal evil. In South Africa, for example, more than half (53%) of those 
who see the current system as a lesser evil support democracy, as compared to 
the 43 percent who saw the current regime as an equal evil and the 29 percent 
who saw it as a greater. In South Korea, more than two-thirds of lesser-evil 
perceivers (67%) support democracy, as compared to just under two-thirds 
(66%) that saw the current regime as an equal evil and just more than one-half 
(53%) that saw it as a greater evil. In essence, the less unfavorably South 
Africans and South Koreans compare the current system with the old system, 
the more strongly they are in favour of democracy. This finding from both 
countries, which were ruled by the authoritarian regimes of divergent natures, 
confirms the Churchillian hypothesis linking improving political experiences 
with a commitment to democracy. 
Nonetheless, a careful scrutiny of the data reported in Table 3 reveals that in 
both South Africa and South Korea, the strongest support for democracy does 
not occur among those who view their current democratic system as a lesser 
evil, a system that performs badly but less undesirably than its authoritarian 
predecessor, but among those who view their current system as a non-evil that 
performs much better than the system of their authoritarian past. This finding 
suggests that a new democratic system would have the greatest support from its 
citizens when they believe the end result of democratisation is a non-evil, well-
functioning system of governance that performs better than the evil, 
malfunctioning system they had previously. The Churchillian notion of 
democracy, however, touches only on how a negative perception of democracy 
could coexist with support for democracy in the wake of regime change; it 
offers no basis for understanding how a positive perception of democracy would 
affect citizen support. Substantively, therefore, the Churchillian notion of 
democracy as a lesser evil cannot fully unravel the cultural dynamics of 
democratisation.   
6. Summary and Conclusions 
What does democracy mean to ordinary people with little experience in 
democratic politics and no knowledge of democratic theory?  When do they 
decide to embrace democracy as the most preferred system of governance, and 
why do they do so? These questions, which focus on the practical experiences 
of individual citizens in new democracies, must be fully answered for us to 
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unravel the process of democratisation taking place right now in countries 
around the world. Believing he could offer insight into why democratisation 
succeeds, Winston Churchill offered the notion of democracy as a lesser evil, 
saying, “… democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other 
forms that have been tried form time to time.”   
In emphasising that a new democratic regime does not have to be positively 
attractive to become the only political game in town, the Churchill notion 
constitutes a clear and meaningful alternative to the idealistic or positively 
oriented paradigm that has guided the study of third-wave democracies for the 
past two decades. Nonetheless, until now, this notion of democracy as a lesser 
evil had neither been explicated fully nor tested outside post-Communist 
Europe. This paper has sought to explicate and test Churchill’s notion of a lesser 
evil systematically with two sets of public opinion data recently collected from 
South Africa and South Korea.   
These data were analysed to determine whether ordinary people actually 
perceive democracy as a lesser evil and whether or not lesser evil perceptions 
motivate them to support it to a greater extent than other perceptions. 
Empirically, it was found that at least some South Africans and South Koreans 
do perceive democracy as a lesser evil, indicating that the notion of a lesser evil 
can help differentiate the various negative sentiments ordinary people 
experience with the newly installed democratic rule. Theoretically, lesser-evil 
perceptions of the existing democratic system were found to lead to greater 
support for democracy than other evil perceptions. Obviously, these findings 
seem to validate the lesser-evil notion as a concept as well as a hypothesis.    
Nonetheless, vast majorities in both of these countries do not see their current 
democratic regime as a lesser evil, as did Churchill. In fact, most people do not 
see democracy in a negative light, or as an evil, at all. The notion of democracy 
as a lesser evil is applicable only to very small minorities of the South African 
and South Korean populations. Moreover, these minorities of lesser-evil 
perceivers are not supportive of democracy as strongly as those who perceive 
that the malfunctioning regime of the authoritarian past has been transformed 
into the well-functioning regime of the democratic present. On the basis of these 
findings, we conclude that the Churchillian notion of democracy as a lesser evil 
is of limited use as an alternative paradigm for the study of democratisation, 
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